Abstract   This article argues that dramatic political change in State A –such as revolution –poses a threat to the interests that other states B share with it. The more salient those interests are to State B, the greater the threat posed by domestic political change within State A. Thus revolutionary changes in one state place the leaders of formerly friendly states into a domain of losses, motivating risk-seeking behavior in hopes of reversing these losses. Conversely, the new leaders of the revolutionary state initiate similarly risk-seeking behavior to defend their new endowments. The conflicts that result sow the seeds of long-lasting enmity (rivalry) between former allies and trade partners. I test this argument in a dataset of rivalry onset during the period 1950-2005 and find evidence that in the wake of dramatic political change State A, rivalries are most likely to form between A and its close partners.

Word Count: 10966

Introduction

What causes rivalry? This should be a question of utmost importance to scholars of interstate conflict. The persistence of three ongoing conflicts –in Iraq, Syria and Yemen – is frequently attributed to activities of rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia. Similarly, much worry is expressed by Western policymakers and pundits about the possible resurrection of the rivalry between Russia and the West due to growing Russian influence in the Balkans and the Middle East. Finally, growth in Chinese power-projection capabilities and renewed insistence from Beijing regarding Chinese control of the Western Pacific threatens to intensify the current rivalry between China and the United States and U.S. allies in the Pacific. Given this apparent resurgence in antagonistic behavior between old and new rivals alike, along with the threat they pose to global stability, understanding the way in which rivalries form should be one of the primary goals of current interstate conflict research. By some estimates, rivalries make up only 1 to 5% of dyads, but account for 50 to 80% of all interstate wars (Stinnet & Diehl 2001, Colaresi Rasler & Thompson 2007). Unfortunately, however, research into rivalry formation has identified only few potential causes –the occurrence of large systemic shocks, such as world war or the realignment of capabilities following the industrial revolution (Diehl & Goertz 2001, Goertz & Diehl 1995); the existence of unresolved issues of contention between states, such as territorial disputes (Vasquez & Leskiw 2001, Stinnet & Diehl 2001); or otherwise stalemated disputes (Stinnet & Diehl 2001).

Importantly, research on the causes of rivalry to date has focused largely on explanations at the international level. These explanations fail to explain the emergence of enmities such as those between the United States and Cuba or the U.S. and Iran, which were not accompanied by large international shocks or preexisting disputes. An explanation rooted in changing domestic politics is necessary to explain these relationships. To date, relatively little work has been done to understand the linkages between domestic politics and rivalry

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formation.[1] Rather, current research has largely turned away from the causes of rivalry to focus, instead, on the effects of rivalry (see Conrad 2011, Findley et al. 2012, Boutton 2014, Haynes 2015). This turn away from exploring the causes of rivalry is surprising, especially given the lack of understanding of the domestic influences on rivalry formation. The causes of any given rivalrous relationship should be expected to influence the behavior of the rivals toward one another. It seems unreasonable to think that we can adequately understand the effects of rivalry –the behaviors of rivals – without a thorough understanding of why states become antagonistic toward one another in the first place. Additionally, rivalrous behavior must, in large part, be driven by the interplay of domestic political interests within the two states engaged in rivalry. If researchers are to develop a thorough understanding of either the causes or effects of rivalry, the effect of domestic politics on rivalrous behavior can no longer be ignored. As such, this analysis seeks to make a valuable contribution to our understanding of rivalry formation by more fully exploring a largely unprobed link between dramatic political change within a state and the subsequent onset of international rivalry.

In exploring this relationship between domestic politics and rivalry formation, I theorize the existence of a conditional relationship between domestic political change in one state and the interests that state shares with others. When two states share highly salient common interests dramatic change in the domestic politics of one state increases the likelihood of rivalry formation in that dyad –as compared to a dyad in which states share few common interests. Put bluntly, revolution can transform friendly states into enemies. I argue that this is the case because changing domestic politics within one state will threaten the interests shared between that state and others with which it interacts, providing incentive for those other states to attempt to reassert the previous status quo, by force if necessary. This leads to both states to view the other as 'enemy', increasing suspicion of the other state's behavior

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[1] An exception to this is the literature linking state independence from colonial rule to rivalry formation (Diehl & Goertz 2001, Stinnet & Diehl 2001, Goertz & Diehl 1995).

in all areas and beginning a process of issue accumulation that culminates in long-lasting enmity (Dreyer 2010a; 2010b).

In the remainder of this paper, I test this argument in a dataset of rivalry onset for the period 1950-2005. I find that both revolution in a state and significant change in a leader's support coalition are associated with an increase in the likelihood that state enters into a rivalry within the next five years. Further analysis reveals, however, that rivalry onset seems most likely to occur between a revolutionary state and its friends in the international system –specifically those states B with which it shares a military alliance, significant foreign policy preferences or significant trade. This finding illuminates a previously unknown pathway to rivalry and demonstrates the importance studying the influence of domestic politics on rivalry formation. Further, this finding has interesting implications for the study of the conflict-proneness of revolutionary states, possibly indicating that current explanations are incomplete.

Systemic Shocks and Rivalry

Research on the causes of rivalry has focused largely on interstate level explanations, examining the effect of large international shocks –world wars, the end of colonialism or the re-arranging of the global balance of power due to uneven industrialization –on rivalry formation. Goertz & Diehl (1995, 2001) argue that these dramatic upheavals significantly alter the interests of states. Due to these altered national interests, new sets of states come into conflict due to newly conflicting interests, while in other cases, previously contentious issues become less salient. Thus large systemic shocks are expected to lead to the end of some rivalries and the beginning of others (Diehl & Goertz 2001, Goertz & Diehl 1995). Further research has added that the occurrence of a stalemated dispute between two states, representing a disagreement that is not sufficiently resolved by the initial round of conflict, is a primary motivator of rivalry because both states in question continue to work toward victory (Stinnet & Diehl 2001). Valeriano (2013) employs an international-level explanation

of rivalry that does not rely on system shocks, but in which rivalries grow from an initial dispute due to states' application of power-politics strategies –alliance building, arms buildups, and escalation of demands –as their primary tool in resolving these disputes.

Relatively little research on the domestic political determinants of rivalry exists. One exception can be found in the argument that domestic political shocks, such as state birth, likely motivate the formation of many rivalries (Diehl & Goertz 2001, Goertz & Diehl 1995, Stinnet & Diehl 2001). More recent research has gone on to provide further support for this argument. Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson (2007 p.83) note that roughly half of rivalries that include at least one state that gained independence after 1816 begin within a short period of that independence event. Conrad and Souva (2011) find evidence to suggest that rivalry is unlikely to form between democratic states. Similarly, Bennett demonstrates that regime change within one state in a currently existing rivalry is associated with an increase in the probability that this rivalry is terminated (Bennett 1997, Bennett 1998). Goertz & Diehl (1995), however find no link between regime change and rivalry onset.

By focusing almost entirely on changes to the international system to explain rivalry, most analysts fail to account for the pre-existing relationships between states and how domestic political change threatens these relationships. Prior to some form of domestic political change in one state, that state and others are already engaged in various and diverse relationships. These heterogeneous preexisting relationships set equally heterogeneous incentives that other states face when responding to regime change within the initial state. Thus, it seems necessary that the effect of a large political change in one state upon its relationships with other states must be conditional upon the character of those preexisting relationships. States that are enemies may see their disputes resolved by a change in the domestic politics of one state, as was found by Bennett. States that share deep interests with one another, however, should be particularly effected by dramatic changes in the domestic politics of a close partner. I argue below, that these deeply interconnected states are likely to move from

a state of friendship to one of enmity or rivalry due to major changes in the domestic political makeup of one.

Domestic Political Change, Policy Change and Rivalry Onset

In the following section, I lay out my argument regarding the effects of major domestic political changes and the policy reforms that follow in one state –State A –upon the relationship between the change state and others with which it interacts –States B. *Domestic political change* refers to change in the preferences of the support coalition upon which a state's leader relies to maintain office. This change can occur in two general ways. It is possible that the composition of the support coalition remains unchanged but that the policy preferences of its members change in response to the natural evolution of problems and opportunities facing a society. This sort of domestic political change is relatively commonplace, occurring within most types of regime as time progresses. A second form of domestic political change is that which brings new elements of society into the support coalition while excluding other groups that previously held power. This restructuring of the support coalition also serves to change its aggregate preferences. I argue that changes to the composition of the support coalition, by bringing in preferences that were previously not included, represents a more significant level of change in aggregate preferences than does the incremental creep that occurs within an ongoing coalition that sees no change in composition.

I use the term *radical domestic political change* to refer to domestically driven events that lead to a complete or near complete replacement of one support coalition by another. I use the above language rather than more familiar terms such as regime change or leader turnover for two reasons. First, these more familiar terms each represent a subset of changes to the composition of a state's *government* rather than to a change of its preferences. While regime change and leader turnover are related to domestic political change –i.e. domestic political change drives regime change and leader turnover –these events should primarily be thought of as indicators of the severity of the underlying domestic political change rather

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than conflated directly with change in the preferences of the support coalition. Regime change, for example, would be thought of as the result of a more severe form of domestic change, in most cases, than would be routine leader turnover due to shifting preferences within a stable regime.

Changes to the structure of domestic politics are likely not, of themselves, sufficient to cause conflict. If a new regime were to come to power and follow precisely the policies of the previous regime (perhaps because the new and old support coalitions share similar preferences), there is no *ex-ante* reason to expect this regime change to cause conflict[2]. However, radical domestic political changes are likely to result in actual change in both foreign and domestic policies pursued by the state. These radical changes –revolution for example –wipe away the former political structure and bring an entirely new support coalition to power, thus providing a new leader with significant incentives to reform the policies followed by the state.

Policy Change and the Ex-Ante Relationship

I argue that radical domestic political change drives significant change in policies pursued by states, and because of this, can motivate conflict where it did not exist previously. Whether a given state's change of domestic politics serves to motivate conflict is dependent upon the *ex-ante* relationships between that State A and those States B with which it interacts. When two states are "friendly," –when states hold many trade, security or other interests in one another –sufficiently large changes in the domestic politics of one state of the pair establish an expectation that major policy changes will follow, and that these policy changes may be a threat to those interests that the opposite state possesses in it.

In such an environment, domestic political actors in State B who hold investments or are engaged in significant trade with State A will feel their economic interests to be under

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[2]Thyne and co-authors provide an example. They attribute the stability of the Egypt-Israeli and Egypt-United States military partnerships following Egypt's 2013 coup to the immediate pledge by coup-leaders to maintain previous policy in regard to Israel (Thyne et al. 2018).

threat. Given these fears, if even minor detrimental policy change follows the change in State A's domestic politics, these elites will pressure their own government to intervene to protect their interests at this first sign that their fears will be realized. Similarly, major political change in a state that is important to the opposite state's national security is likely to cause domestic publics in the opposite state to experience an increase in perceptions of threat and insecurity, similarly motivating calls for the government to intervene to protect the security interests of its people. The leadership of State B will fear a loss of support among their own support coalition if they fail to take strong action to restore the previous status quo.

For their part, the leadership of the change state prioritizes maintaining their grip on the power that has just recently been achieved. This necessitates that the leadership maintain its support coalition among the elements of domestic society. To the extent that the support coalition backing the new leadership is different from that of the old leadership, we would expect that the new leaders will be required to respond to a different set of preferences and thus, their desire to change policy will be determined by the difference between their supporting coalition and the previous supporting coalition. Further, having recently supplanted a leader or regime that failed to cater to the demands of its support coalition should serve to make the new leadership wary of suffering the same fate. That one leader or regime has been recently replaced suggests that important elements of society desire major change in the policies implemented by the government. If the new leadership caves in to foreign demands they fail to provide the policy desired by the new support coalition. This allows room for other members of the reform movement or counter-revolutionary elements to replace the new leadership before it can consolidate its hold on power.

Domestic Political Change and International Conflict

Prospect theory, as formulated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) provides an understanding as to how the aforementioned domestic political change ultimately leads states into conflict. According to prospect theory, actors make choices in a process consisting of two

phases.[3] In the first *editing* phase, actors organize and simplify the available options for later evaluation. Framing effects, are argued to significantly affect the succeeding evaluation process. While Kahneman and Tversky discuss a number of specific framing effects that occur during the editing process, for purposes of this discussion, the most relevant aspect of the editing phase is coding of the location of an actor's reference point. Decision-makers define the value of outcomes in terms of gains or losses from a reference point –generally the status quo –rather than in terms of the absolute value of the outcome.

Once the available options have been edited, an evaluation phase begins in which the decision-maker selects the option with the highest value as determined by the product of a *value function* and a *probability weighting function.* These functions combine to provide several expectations about decision-making under conditions of risk. Most important of these for purposes of this analysis is an observed tendency for actors to be risk-seeking in a domain of losses and risk averse in a domain of gains (Tversky & Kahneman 1992). When contemplating certain losses, actors are likely to over-estimate the value of a risky gamble that offers only a moderate chance of reversing those certain losses, even if the gamble risks significant additional losses.

The behavioral expectations provided by prospect theory of decision-makers when facing risky choices serve to explain why domestic political change in a "friendly" dyad will lead to conflict[4]. Following radical political change in a friendly state, State B is likely to suffer a loss in terms of economic interests, alliance benefits[5], cooperation in foreign policy, or all of the above. This policy change harms the leadership of State B in two ways. First, the loss

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[3]See Levy, 1992; 1996 for a thorough discussion of prospect theory and its implications for IR research.

[4]While the usefulness of prospect theory for explaining political phenomena has been questioned (Levy 1997), it has been usefully applied to the choices made by individual leaders in a number of crisis situations such as those of Kennedy and Khrushchev during the Cuban missile crisis (Haas 2001), Carter during the Iranian hostage crisis (McDermott 1992) and Bush during the run-up to the 1991 Gulf War (McDermott & Kugler 2001). The arguments put forward in this analysis are similarly centered around crisis decisions made by state leaders, thus prospect theory is applicable and provides for interesting insights.

[5]Morrow (1991) discusses that alliance partners may gain either security or increased autonomy, both of which can be threatened by policy change in an allied state.

of an allied government or friendly trade partner damages the security interests and prestige of State B in the international environment, placing the leadership of State B in a domain of losses in foreign affairs. Similarly, loss of an ally or trade partner harms the interests of domestic political and economic elites in State B, which drive demands for action on the part of the leader of State B and threatens to undermine its leader's tenure should the demanded response not be forthcoming. That the loss of an important ally or trade partner can place the leader of a state in a domain of losses across a number of dimensions is vital to a prospect-theory centric explanation of conflict, as the losses suffered by a leader must be sufficiently grave as to make him or her unwilling to accept the new status quo as the reference point from which deviations will be evaluated (McDermott 1992). Given these losses, we should expect the leadership of State B to prioritize re-establishing the previous status quo, even if this means undertaking risky behaviors that threaten significant additional losses, so long as these behaviors also provide a reasonable chance to avoid paying the certain cost of accepting the revised status quo.

For their part, the new leadership of State A has established a newly beneficial status quo for him or herself. The newly achieved possession of the government of State A represents a good that has been added to the endowment of the leader. Evidence suggests that, when a good such as control of the government is added to a leader's endowment we should expect the leadership of State A to quickly renormalize (Jervis 1992), taking the newly established status quo as the reference from which they will define gains or losses, exhibiting an *endowment effect* (Thaler 1980, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1990, p.1342).

The leaders of these once friendly states find themselves holding mutually unacceptable reference points. If either reference point becomes the new status quo, the other leader faces certain losses, thus both leaders make decisions from within a domain of losses and are likely to run significant risks –such as supporting counter revolutionaries or engaging in military intervention, or conversely, of refusing to accommodate in hopes of weathering likely military

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action. These actions solidify the belief among the people and policymakers of each state that the other has become an enemy. Once these 'enemy' perceptions take root, all activities of the other state are viewed through a lens of suspicion and are likely to be seen as a threat to one's own interests. Once this perception of hostility on the part of the other has taken root, issue disputes tend to accumulate between the two states, cementing rivalry (Dreyer 2010).

An example of the process described above can be seen in the relationship between the United States and Cuba before and after the Cuban Revolution. Prior to the revolution, the United States and Cuba shared a defensive alliance through the Organization of American States. The two states also participated in a strong trading relationship in which American nationals and corporations possessed a great deal of property within Cuba. Some estimates suggest that as much as 65% of the Cuban sugar industry was under U.S. ownership and some 95% of Cuban exports were bound for the U.S. market (Fitzgibbon & Thomas 1972 p. 335-337). In the immediate wake of the Cuban Revolution, these ties of trade and investment remained intact. However, the policy goals of the Castro regime differed significantly from those of the Batista government, ensuring that a period of economic and social upheaval would follow the success of the Cuban Revolution.

American property interests came under threat in May of 1959 when Fidel Castro began to implement a policy of land reform that would ultimately result in the seizure of much American-owned property (Snyder 1999 p. 273). Further, throughout the first few years of the reform process, some 600 American firms were nationalized (Snyder 1999 p. 276). The Cuban Revolution inflicted humiliation and economic losses on the United States through the removal of the Batista regime with which the U.S. government had close security ties and also throughout the following several years as the reform process increasingly put U.S. economic interests in Cuba at risk.

I contend that it was the continued threat posed to U.S. interests by Castro's reforms that

sowed the seeds of rivalry between the U.S. and Cuba. Cuban reform motivated President Eisenhower, in March of 1960, to authorize agents of the Central Intelligence Agency to begin arming and training Cuban exiles to build a paramilitary invasion force. This represents a very risky endeavor that, if failed, would cause foreign and domestic political losses for the president, but if successful would restore the pre-existing status quo. As we know, this risky decision would ultimately culminate in the failed Bay of Pigs invasion and would go on to motivate further hostility between the two states, eventually cementing the new rivalry.

For their part, leaders such as Castro, who have implemented a major change in state policy after coming to power, have significant incentives to respond aggressively to a former ally's attempts to re-establish the old status quo. Following a revolutionary overthrow, it is quite likely that a period of relative weakness will characterize the early days of the reform effort. During these early reforms, the leader must build support for his or her new policies, fend off ideological rivals and otherwise consolidate power. It would be especially dangerous for such a leader to signal a wavering commitment to the reform process. A leader brought to power by radical domestic political changes would risk the loss of power to more hard-line domestic rivals if he were to give in to the demands to halt the reform effort that are made by or former ally. Thus, faced with losses if he were to abandon the reform effort, a leader such as Castro responds to an ally's demands from within a domain of losses, and is likely to run great risks to maintain power. Once this initial hostility took root in the minds of the people and policy-makers of both countries, every action of the other state was viewed through a lens of suspicion, and issues of contention began to accumulate quickly over ideological and positional concerns (Dreyer 2010a). Long-lasting enmity was the result.

I argue that the initiation of rivalry between Cuba and the United States is in no way a unique occurrence. Rather, I argue that the U.S./Cuba relationship is illustrative of the process that a number of other dyads have undergone on their way to a rivalrous relationship. Tables 3 and 4 display two lists of rivalries that were initiated within 5 rears of a major

domestic political change as well as a summary of the major *ex-ante* interest shared between those states.[6] Between 24% and 33% of all rivalries initiated during the 1950-2005 time period seem to follow the pattern of the U.S./Cuba example.

Given the expectations discussed above, I derive the following hypothesis regarding the interactive effect of shared interests between states with radical policy change, which I then test empirically.

H1: The effect of radical policy change upon the probability of rivalry formation in the dyad should be zero in the absence of shared interests between states, but should become positive and increase in magnitude as shared interests between states in the dyad increase to high levels.

Radical Change and Outside Intervention

The discussion above still leaves a question to be answered. If future change in policy within State A threatens the interests of the opposing state, why does State B allow the domestic political change to occur in the first place? Why does B not act to preserve the initial government of A, thus preserving the *ex-ante* status quo before losses can accrue? Certainly, in many cases, this is exactly what does occur. Witness the long history of outside interventions by one state to prop up the government of another (Butler 2003, Saideman 2001, Pearson 1974). There are, however, at least five reasons for which a state may not intervene in another state's civil conflict to preserve its own interests.

First, states may possess insufficient capabilities to ensure victory to an allied government in their civil war. Second, when states have the capability to support an allied government, third party support of the rebels may still lead to the downfall of the allied government.

In either of these cases, State B's inability to prevent a change of government in A does

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[6]In Table 3, this radical domestic political change is a revolution defined using a measure of revolutionary change derived from Jeff Colgan's 2012 dataset of revolutionary leaders, as discussed in the next section. Table 4 displays rivalries following within 5 years of a change in source of leader support as drawn from the CHISOLS dataset –also described in the next section.

not imply that B prefers that this change occur. While B may not be able to remove the new government of A, disputes between the two are likely as long as policy reform in State A continues to threaten the interests that B held in the former regime.

Third, potential intervening states may lack the resolve or political will to support a friendly government in its fight for survival even when they possess the capabilities. A leader may face negative domestic consequences for intervening in the allied state that are sufficient to make intervention politically unacceptable.

Fourth, it is also possible that militarily potent third parties miscalculate the cost of allowing an allied government to be deposed. International relations often make for strange bedfellows, and there is no inherent reason that a state friendly to a government in peril could not also achieve friendly relations with a successor government, particularly if the third party in question were to refrain from intervention, thus giving tacit approval to the rebels. Rebel and revolutionary groups are aware that allies of the regime must make this calculation when contemplating an intervention to support the regime, and may moderate their demands or ideological stance to induce further uncertainty over the cost that a third parties will pay for failing to intervene (Werner 2000).

Fifth, and finally, it is entirely possible that State B does not appreciate that major changes are occurring in State A. Not all radical changes are the result of drawn out civil war, nor are the ultimate outcomes of many civil conflicts easily predicted. The Egyptian revolution of 2011 spanned only 18 days from the Day of Anger on January 25 to the resignation of Mubarak on February 11 ("Timeline: Egypt's revolution", 2011). Most states would be hard pressed to recognize that the protest movement represented a genuine threat to the regime as well as mount a major military operation to support the government on a timeline of 18 days.

In any of these cases we should see that State B does not act to preserve the *ex-ante* status quo even though its interests are at risk. However, once radical change has come to

pass, State B will suffer damage to the interests that it shared with State A and will enter a domain of losses as discussed in the previous section.

Research Design

Unit of Analysis and Scope

I construct a dataset consisting of dyad-year observations during the period 1950-2005 for all politically relevant dyads in which both states have at least 500,000 inhabitants.[7] This provides a sample of 43,144 observations.[8] I fit a series of logistic regression models on this sample, which are presented in the next section.[9]

Operationalization

Rivalry Onset: In measuring enmity between states, I employ a conceptualization of rivalry put forward by William Thompson (Thompson 1995; Thompson & Dreyer 2011).[10] Thompson's conceptualization emphasizes that rivals must mutually believe themselves and their interests to be under threat due to the existence and activities of the other state (Thompson & Dreyer 2011, p.2). Thus, while the existence of a hostile relationship between states is necessary to the formation of rivalry in this conceptualization, there exists no set threshold of militarized action that defines the start-point of a rivalry. Rather, Thompson examines historical records and primary sources for evidence that policymakers in both states in a dyad view the other as threatening, and that both states believe a military confrontation to be likely, and thus take steps to prepare for conflict (Thompson & Dreyer 2011 p.3).

The dependent variable is the initiation of rivalry within a dyad. The variable *Rivalry Onset* is coded using the inventory of rivalries developed by Thompson and Dreyer (2011),

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[7]Lags of trade data begin in 1950 and lags of the main revolution variable run out in 2005.

[8]6,271 observations are lost due to missing data on Joint U.N. voting –this effectively limits the sample to only U.N. member nations. 19 observations are lost due to missing V-Dem data.

[9]I also include a replication of this main analysis using the Rare Events Logit (King & Zeng, 2001), which is included in the appendix. Coefficients for the three interaction terms remain positive in all cases. The interaction between trade dependence and revolution, however, fails to achieve statistical significance at conventional levels in the RE-Logit.

[10]In the interest of saving space, see the appendix to this paper for a discussion of the preferability of this measure.

and takes the value "1" in any dyad in which a rivalry was coded to have began in the year in question, and "0" otherwise.[11] There are 55 cases of rivalry initiation in the sample under investigation. For any observed dyad-year in which a rivalry is already ongoing between the two states –having begun at least one year prior –there is no possibility that a new rivalry initiation could be observed. Thus, observations in which rivalry is ongoing are dropped from the dataset.

In 10 cases, a rivalry is coded to have begun in the same year a revolution or SOLS change –as discussed below –is coded to have occurred. In these instances I have consulted the narratives constructed by Thompson and Dreyer to determine which came first: revolution/SOLS change or rivalry. To ensure temporal precedence, it is important to establish that the initiation of rivalry did not precede the revolution. Thus, I examine the narratives for these 10 rivalries to see if Thompson and Dreyer make a note that the state not undergoing revolution intervened in any way during the revolutionary event or civil war leading to regime change. If Thompson and Dreyer note that one state intervened in another prior to both the political change and the formation of the rivalry, the dependent variable is coded "0" to limit the possibility that cases of reverse causality influence the findings of this analysis. In three of the 10 cases so examined, the second state in the dyad intervened in the other prior to the political change event Thus, for these 3 cases, *Rivalry Initiation* is coded "0".

Radical Domestic Political Change: I employ a measure derived from Jeff Colgan's (2012) revolutionary leader dataset as an indicator of radical political change within one state. *Revolution* takes the form of a dummy variable and is equal to "1" for any observation in which one state in the dyad has undergone a revolutionary political change. To determine whether a revolution has occurred, historical records are consulted for evidence of change within seven different domains of domestic policy These seven policy areas include a measure

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[11]For purposes of robustness testing, I also fit a series of models on a dataset including only rivalries that appear in both Thompson & Dreyer's 2011 dataset and Klein, Goertz & Diehl's 2006 inventory. Results generally follow those of the main analysis and can be found in Table 14 in the appendix.

of changes to the selection or powers of the executive; the structure of property ownership; the relationship between state and religion; the official political ideology of the state; protections for ethnicity or gender; the official state name; or the establishment of a revolutionary council or committee (Colgan 2012). The variable *Radical Change* is coded a "1" for a dyad in any year in which a new leader comes to power in at least one of the two states and who institutes major policy changes in at least three of these seven categories.[12]

Note that, while this variable is coded using Colgan's 2012 data, the variable constructed for this analysis is not identical to Colgan's coding as used in that study. Colgan's measure covers the entire tenure of a leader who implements radical changes in policy after coming to power –thus taking the value "1" for any year in which that leader remains in office (Colgan 2010 p.675). Unlike Colgan, however, I am interested only in the initiation of major political change in a state, thus I focus on the year in which a new leader comes to power, not the entire period of his or her tenure. Further, I am concerned primarily with the initial revolutionary event rather than the tenure of revolutionary leaders. Thus, I also do not include the start of subsequent terms of office of a revolutionary leader, nor do I include normal transitions from one leader of the revolution to another in this measure. I construct a variable that takes the value "1" only for the first year in a leader's tenure, if that leader goes on to implement radical policy change. Thus, Colgan's radical ideology variable takes the value "1" for Chile for years 1973-1989 (indicating the span of Pinochet's tenure), the *Revolution* variable employed in this analysis takes the value "1" for Chile only in 1973. Further, Colgan's measure includes Ferrer's second term in Costa Rica (starting in 1953) when I do not. Thus Costa Rica is coded, in my data, as undergoing a revolution only at the start of Ferrer's first term in 1948.

A second measure of political change is used in robustness tests. This variable is coded

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[12]While the selection of a threshold of three areas of policy change as an indication of major political change is somewhat arbitrary, Tables 11-13 in the appendix display the robustness of the findings discussed below to the use of alternate thresholds.

using the Change in Source of Leader Support (CHISOLS) dataset (Mattes, Leeds & Matsumura 2016). *SOLS Change* takes the value of "1" for any dyad-year in which one state is coded in CHISOLS to have undergone a change in the source of leader support that *did not* result from a peaceful democratic election.[13]

Once these codings are completed, one further adjustment is made. The argument presented above centers around rivalry that stems from dramatic political change within an existing state rather than rivalry stemming from state birth. Thus, for any year in which a state is considered non-independent or in which a new state is born, *SOLS Change* and *Revolution* are coded "0" for the state in question.[14] 80 states experience *Revolution* During the observation period and 330 states experience a *SOLS Change.*

Shared Interests: The argument presented above centers specifically on the behavior of states that share a close relationship following a revolutionary change in policy in one. I use three measures of shared interest. First, I employ a measure of the existence of a formal and publicly-declared defense pact between two states in a dyad. The signing of a defense pact between two states is an observable signal on behalf of each state that the state in question perceives itself to possess an interest in preserving the status quo in the other. Usefully, this interest in preserving the allied state may result from a number of factors such as defense concerns, economic interdependence, or shared ideology. Thus, we should expect that the existence of a publicly declared defense pact is an observable indicator of a wide range of shared interests that may be put at risk due to changes in the domestic policy of the allied

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[13]SOLS changes resulting from peaceful democratic election indicate only a change in the political party holding the executive office. While the theory offered above makes no specific claim about the intensity of political change that is necessary to trigger rivalry initiation, it seems unlikely that a change as commonplace as the peaceful hand-off of power from one party to another through democratic elections would represent a radical change in domestic politics, in the vast majority of casese. Thus, to ensure that this measure match the concept discussed above, peaceful electoral transitions are coded a "0" in this measure of policy change.

[14]In the dataset, only the *SOLS Change* variable used in robustness testing is effected by this additional coding rule. In 15 cases, the coding of a SOLS Change is revised from "1" to "0" by following this rule. Colgan's coding rules already remove leaders who come to power due to state birth, thus no further adjustment to *Revolution* is necessary.

state. Further, it seems reasonable to expect that states will only act upon interests that their leaders or powerful domestic groups recognize as salient, thus, using the declaration of a defense pact –a clear signal of a recognition of important shared interests –likely provides for an appropriate test of the hypothesis. The variable *Alliance* is coded using the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset (Leeds, Ritter & Mitchell 2002). This variable takes the value "1" for any year in which a defensive alliance exists between the states in a dyad and "0" otherwise.

I also employ a measure of shared interests based upon trade ties. To measure *Trade Dependence*, I use data on the value of trade between two states along with national Gross Domestic Product of each state, as taken from Gledditsch (2002) "Expanded Trade and GDP Data." *Trade Dependence* is a continuous variable constructed using the weak-link procedure. For each State A in a dyad I sum the total value of imports to and exports from State B, and then divide this sum by State A's GDP, thus creating a ratio of State A's trade with State B to State A's total domestic output.[15] I repeat this procedure reversing states A and B, then keep the lowest value of the two –the weak link. This raw measure ranges between 0 and 0.21. Thus, I normalize the variable between 0 and 1 to make coefficient estimates more easily comparable across variables.

Third, I use a measure of shared foreign policy interests between states that is derived from roll call votes in the United Nations General Assembly (Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten 2017). The source dataset provides a spatial measure of voting in which each value represents a state's ideal point. Thus, as two state's values draw closer together this represent more congruent foreign policy preferences. To construct my measure of foreign policy similarity, I first take the absolute difference between dyad members' ideal points. I then normalize these values between 0 and 1 to make estimates more easily comparable across variables. Finally, I subtract the resulting value from 1 to invert it. This procedure results in a continuous

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[15]This is expressed as $\frac{Import_{BtoA} + Export_{AtoB}}{GDP_A}$.

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variable such that a value of "1" represents the maximum and "0" the minimum congruence between two states' U.N. General Assembly voting record.

Interaction Terms: Finally, I code 5-year interactions between the aforementioned measures of shared interests and the measures of policy change discussed above. For purposes of this analysis, I consider a five-year period of time following political change within one state in a dyad. I expect that a new leader who comes to power with the hope of implementing a radical policy program will have managed to consolidate power and implement a sufficiently large subset of the planned reforms for other states to gauge their ultimate extent. Thus, it is during this five-year period that other states would judge the threats to their interests, and I would expect to see any conflict motivated by the revolution to occur within this period of time. As such, the primary independent variables of interest –the interactions between measures of shared interests and measures of policy change –take a non-zero value during the five years $t_1 - t_5$ following a policy change event, representing the five-year transition period after a change in policy t_0, and "0" for all other observations.[16]

I also employ a number of control variables in hopes of mitigating the possibility of spuriousness or omitted variable bias influencing the findings.

Contiguity: Contiguity of borders is a well-known contributer to the likelihood of conflict behavior between states, including rivalry behavior (Stinnet & Diehl 2001, Lemke & Reed 2001) and should be expected to influence alliance formation and trade as well. Further, controlling for contiguity has been shown to be necessary for avoiding omitted variable bias in studies positing a positive association between alliances and conflict behavior (Ray 1995). This variable is coded "1" if the states in a dyad share a land border or are separated by less than 400 nautical miles of water (the maximum distance at which two 200 mile economic exclusion zones could interact) according to the Correlates of War Direct Contiguity V3.2

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[16]In robustness testing I examine the effect of using observation windows of different lengths. Tables 7-9 display the results of analyses using observation windows of 2-8 years.

dataset (Stinnett et al. 2002), and "0" otherwise.

Military Capability Disparity: Thompson and Dreyer argue explicitly that some level of competitiveness in military capabilities is necessary to rivalry formation (2011 p.3). Additionally, evidence suggests that the balance of capabilities affects the likelihood that defense pacts are signed between states (Walt 1985). Thus, as with shared borders, we must control for the distribution of military capabilities in a dyad to reduce the likelihood that any effects found in our analysis are spurious.

To account for military capabilities, I construct a variable using the Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC) (Singer, Bremer & Stuckey 1972). This variable takes a value equal to the greater of the two capability scores in the dyad divided by the sum of both capability scores.[17] This measure provides a ratio of the military capabilities possessed by the more powerful state in the dyad as compared to the total military capability present in the dyad (Gleditsch, et al. 2008).

Joint Democracy As with the other controls discussed above, the level of jointly democratic institutions in a dyad have been shown to influence the interests shared between states (Leeds, Ritter & Long 2002), as well as the likelihood of rivalry formation in the dyad (Conrad & Souva 2011), and thus must be controlled for.

Democracy is constructed using the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index (Coppedge et al. 2018) and is a continuous variable ranging between 0 and 1. I use a weak-link procedure, taking the lesser of the two Electoral Democracy Index scores in the dyad as a measure of the overall level of democracy in the dyad.

Systemic Shock Shocks to the international order, such as world wars, decolonization and the end of the Cold War have been shown to re-balance power between states and contribute to rivalry onset (Rider & Owsiak, 2015; Diehl, 1995). It is reasonable to expect that shocks that reassign hostile relationships will also re-balance interests that states share

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[17]This is expressed as $\frac{MaxCapability}{MaxCapability+MinCapability}$.

in common. Thus, as is common in studies of rivalry onset, I control for systemic shocks using the procedure introduced by Diehl 1995. This variable takes the value "1" for a 10-year span following the end of the Cold War or any significant changes in the territory of major powers. I draw the specific measure used in this analysis from Rider and Owsiak's (2015) replication data due to it's longer temporal span.

Ongoing Territorial Dispute   The existence of ongoing territorial disputes have commonly been found to contribute to rivalry (Rider & Owsiak, 2015; Vasquez, 2009; Hensel, 2001) and are likely to influence shared interests as well. I control for the existence of an ongoing territorial dispute using data drawn from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) (Frederick et al., 2017).

I also include controls for the existence of a major power in a dyad and the Cold War which takes the value "1" for years 1950-1989. Major powers are most likely to engage in interactions –both hostile and cooperative –with other states. Similarly, the Cold War was a time period in which both rivalry across blocs and alliances and alignment of policy and trade within blocks was the rule of the day. Finally, I control for the temporally dependent nature of conflict by using a cubic polynomial of the years since the end of the last rivalry in a dyad as suggested by Carter and Signorino (2010).

Results

I begin testing the argument above by first assessing the relationship between revolution and rivalry onset. Table 1 displays the simple bi-variate relationship between a dyad's experience of a revolution within the last five years and subsequent onset of rivalry. The table displays observed frequencies without parentheses as well as the frequency that we would expect to observe if there were no systematic relationship (inside parentheses). In this bi-variate analysis we note a strongly significant relationship between revolution and rivalry. Just over three times as many rivalries begin in the immediate wake of a revolution

in one of the states than would be expected by chance.[18] Further, more than one quarter of rivalries (25.5%) that begin during the 1950-2005 time period do so within 5 years of a revolution within one state in the rival pair.[19] [20] This relationship is worth noting on its own. It conforms with previous research on rivalry in that it shows that major domestic political shocks seem to be associated with subsequent rivalry onset(Goertz & Diehl 1995). However, where previous studies have only found support that state birth or independence (Goertz & Diehl 1995, Stinnet & Diehl 2001, Colaresi et al. 2007) but not regime change (Goertz & Diehl 1995) have an effect on rivalry, the current study demonstrates that major changes to the structure of domestic politics within an existing state can also provide an important spark to ignite rivalry.

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Table 1 about here

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Table 2 displays the results of a series of logistic regression models that test the hypothesis discussed above. Robust standard errors are clustered at the dyad level.[21] Figures 1 through 6 display average marginal effects for the three interactions of interest. Model one demonstrates the correlation between revolution and rivalry onset. Models 2-4 display the interactive effect of revolution conditional upon the three measures of shared interests between states that are discussed above. Finally, model 5 combines all shared interest variables in a single model, demonstrating that many different forms of shared interests seem to have independent effects on conflict in the wake of a revolution in one state of a pair.

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[18]Table 5 in the appendix displays a similarly significant relationship between CHISOLS SOLS changes and revolution. 83% more rivalries form in the wake of a SOLS change than would be expected by chance.

[19]A list of rivalries that begin within 5 years of a revolution can be found in Table 3.

[20]For SOLS change, the figure stands at 32.7% of rivalries forming within 5 years.

[21]Specifically, HC3 standard errors.

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As we would expect given the bi-variate correlations seen in Table 1, Model 1 indicates that there remains a positive relationship between revolution within the last five years and the beginning of a subsequent rivalry even while controlling for other commonly theorized causes. However, as predicted in the hypothesis presented above, we see that this relationship is reduced in magnitude and statistical significance and may disappear entirely when accounting for the effect of shared interests in a dyad. In Model 2, *Revolution* takes on a negative sign and approaches significance ($P>|Z| = 0.11$). This seems to indicate that while revolution is positively associated with rivalry onset, these post-revolutionary rivalries do not form at random. Instead, they are determined by the *ex-ante* relationship between the revolutionary state and the friends and allies of the old regime. Given the findings presented here, it may *only* be when two states share close ties *ex-ante* that the occurrence of a revolution will drive them into conflict *ex-post*. This finding provides support for the argument discussed in section 2. Revolutionary states appear to find themselves drawn into conflict because revolution threatens to destroy existing relationships between states, thus inflicts losses upon those states that share valuable ties with the revolutionary state. This begins an intractable antagonistic relationship between the new regime and states aligned with the old regime in which both are unwilling to accept the other's preferred reference point, thus giving birth to rivalry.

It should be noted that, while marginal effect sizes observed in Figures 1-6 are small in absolute value, they represent a substantive increase over the base probability of rivalry onset in the sample (0.001). Figure 2 displays that a revolution in a dyad that is maximally aligned in terms of foreign policy interests leads to more than a five-fold increase in the probability of onset as compared to a dyad in which states share minimal foreign policy alignment after a revolution (an increase of .0055). Similarly, revolution in one state of an

allied pair leads to a doubling in the probability of rivalry onset after revolution as compared to a non-allied dyad (an increase of 0.0021). Increasing trade dependence is associated with a similarly-sized increase in the likelihood of rivalry onset (0.0042) over the range of values for which an effect can be statistically distinguished from zero. Further, these marginal effects are larger than that associated with the occurrence of a systemic shock (0.00025) and are of a similar magnitude to the effect associated with an ongoing territorial dispute (0.0069)[22] –two of the most widely noted causes of interstate rivalry (Rider & Owsiak 2015, Colaresi et al., 2007; Hensel, 2001; Thompson, 2001; Vasquez & Leskiw, 2001; Stinnet & Diehl, 2001; Lemke & Reed, 2001; Goertz & Diehl, 1995).

It should be noted that, while rivalry onsets are exceedingly rare, rivalries account for a large majority of interstate wars. Additionally, the extreme competition between rivals such as Saudi Arabia and Iran over regional influence often destabilizes neighboring governments and entire regions. This competitive behavior between rivals can ignite and exacerbate interstate conflict between the rivals themselves and can contribute to both interstate conflict such as that currently ongoing between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and intrastate conflict in nearby states like the ongoing civil war in Syria. Thus, the extreme consequences associated with rivalry ensure that it cannot be ignored as a subject of study, despite its rarity.

Discussion

The findings presented above have several interesting implications for research on rivalry as well as research on the conflict-proneness of revolutionary states. First, revolution is one clear pathway to rivalry that has not been adequately explored by previous analyses that focus primarily on systemic shocks and state birth. Major shifts in the domestic political landscape of a state have important implications for interstate conflict. Future research should seek to determine the extent to which rivalries born from revolution are comparable to other rivalries in terms of behavior and other characteristics, and also how significant

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[22]both of these are marginal effect sizes derived from Model 1

the extent of political change within a state must be before it motivates outside powers to intervene.

Second, previous research has offered a number of explanations for the empirical regularity that post-revolutionary states seem to engage in conflict at a disproportionate level. The finding presented here casts doubt on some of these arguments and complicates others. Post-revolutionary conflict does not seem to be driven by opportunistic predatory behavior among either the revolutionary state or enemy states hoping to capitalize on the moment of weakness that occurs due to revolution (Maoz 1989). Rather, it seems to be driven by disruptions of pre-revolutionary interdependent relationships. Additionally, if the process of fighting a revolution selects for aggressive risk-seeking personalities in post-revolutionary leaders (Colgan 2010), it also seems that it provides those leaders with incentives to engage in aggression specifically toward friends and allies of the old regime rather than opportunistic aggression toward weaker targets of opportunity. Further explanation of the motivations behind a given revolution may provide more clarity as to why this is the case.

Conclusion

In recent years, attempts to understand rivalries appear to have turned away from examining the causes of these particularly dangerous relationships. Instead, most research into interstate rivalry now appears to focus on the ways in which they influence other aspects of the international system, such as state support for terrorism (Conrad 2011, Findley et al. 2012, Boutton 2014) or the effect of an existing rivalry upon a leader's incentives to engage in diversionary conflict (Haynes 2015). I argue that this is problematic. Attempting to explore the effect of rivalry without first understanding its causes will contribute to significant theoretical and empirical problems. Most research designs require the scholar to have a clear understanding of the underlying process that generates their data sufficiently well to be able to identify and account for spurious relationships between the independent variable –existence of a rivalry–and our dependent variable –the behavior of rivals. Without

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developing a better understanding of the causes of rivalry, it is difficult to believe that we can achieve this.

In this paper I have attempted to address our collective lack of understanding of the causes of rivalry, at least in part, by deriving and testing a new argument regarding the root causes of rivalry formation. As discussed above, this argument centers around the general logic that, when one state undergoes extreme changes to its domestic politics, this endangers its shared relations with other states. Those states are motivated to intervene in the affairs of their straying partner in order to restore the previous status quo and avoid the certain cost of allowing a revolutionary reform in the partner state. These interventions lead to conflict.

This is a novel insight, and I believe a valuable one as well. However, this investigation represents only a first, if promising, attempt to better understand a very complex relationship between states, and illuminates only one rather counter-intuitive process by which states can fall into this relationship. As such, a great deal of additional research is required before we should accept the conclusions of this study. Further, the logic of the argument presented here goes far beyond the narrow test presented. We should expect that the types of interests discussed here are not the only ones that can motivate rivalry in the wake of radical political change in a state. Further, revolutions may not be the only for of domestic political upheaval that can threaten the interests states share and motivate conflict. Further research should expand upon the insight developed in this investigation by examining these various other forms of shared ties to determine which may be salient enough to motivate conflict when threatened by the activities of the states that they tie together, and how significant domestic upheaval in a state must be before it motivates conflict.

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Main Tables and Figures:

Table 1: Bivariate Relationship - Revolution and Rivalry Onset (All dyads 1950-2005)

	No Revolution-Last 5 Years	Revolution-Last 5 Years	Total
No Rivalry Onset	**48,807** **(48,797.3)**	**4,118** **(4,127.7)**	52,925
Rivalry Onset	**41** **(50.7)**	**14** **(4.3))**	55
Total	48,848	4,132	52,980
Pearson chi2 = 23.8663 Pr = 0.000			
Note: Cells display the observed frequency over the expected frequency (in parentheses.)			

Table 2: Logistic Regression of Rivalry Initiation 1950-2005

	(Model 1)	(Model 2)	(Model 3)	(Model 4)
	(Revolution Only)	(Shared Foreign Policy)	(Alliance)	(Trade Dependence)
	$\hat{\beta}$/se	$\hat{\beta}$/se	$\hat{\beta}$/se	$\hat{\beta}$/se
Revolution	2.113***	-4.486	1.169+	1.992***
	(0.492)	(2.869)	(0.600)	(0.496)
$\times$ Shared Foreign Policy		7.405*		
		(3.153)		
$\times$ Alliance			3.409*	
			(1.419)	
$\times$ Trade Dependence				17.016+
				(9.806)
Shared Foreign Policy	3.017+	0.841	3.057+	3.073+
	(1.797)	(1.724)	(1.754)	(1.787)
Alliance	-0.442	-0.467	-2.607*	-0.441
	(0.508)	(0.514)	(1.276)	(0.505)
Trade Dependence	2.154	2.931	5.186	-0.990
	(3.745)	(3.711)	(4.105)	(6.284)
Contiguity	-12.836***	-13.198***	-12.231***	-11.620***
	(1.167)	(1.441)	(1.010)	(0.965)
Capability Disparity	-4.145+	-3.990+	-3.903	-4.062+
	(2.380)	(2.337)	(2.408)	(2.393)
Democracy	-2.882*	-2.885*	-2.673*	-2.818*
	(1.309)	(1.344)	(1.362)	(1.351)
Cold War	0.375	0.329	0.210	0.363
	(0.901)	(0.940)	(0.881)	(0.902)
Systemic Shock	1.198	1.227	1.147	1.186
	(0.964)	(0.985)	(0.985)	(0.962)
Major Power in Dyad	-13.444***	-13.928***	-12.940***	-12.218***
	(0.871)	(1.191)	(0.799)	(0.695)
Ongoing Territorial Dispute	2.679**	2.845**	3.336**	2.690**
	(0.910)	(0.942)	(1.068)	(0.922)
Constant	6.382	8.523*	5.938+	5.096
	(4.228)	(4.003)	(3.519)	(3.881)
Observations	36854	36854	36854	36854

Robust standard errors clustered on the dyad –in parentheses

Cubic polynomial of years of peace included in model but not reported

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 in 2-tail test

Figure 1-6: Marginal Effects of Revolution and Shared Interests

Effect of Revolution conditional on Policy Similarity

Effect of Policy Similarity conditional on Revolution

Effect of Revolution conditional on Alliance

Effect of Alliance conditional on Revolution

Effect of Revolution conditional on Trade*

Effect of Trade conditional on Revolution*

* Note for figures 5 and 6, trade dependence is measured between 0 and 1. However, in this sample, 99% of all observed values are below 0.107. Attempting to assess marginal effects for values of trade dependence greater than 0.107 would be irresponsible. As such, the plots presented here are restricted to values of trade dependence between 0 and 0.107. Plots displaying the marginal effect over the full range of trade dependence can be found in the appendix.

Table 3: Rivalries Following Within 5 Years of Revolution - 1950-2005

Country A	Country B	Revolution Date	Rivalry Onset	ATOP Defense	Top 25% Annually Trade Dependence	Top 25% Annually Policy Similarity	Major Interest
USA	Cuba	1959	1960	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
USA	China	1949	1950	Yes			Yes
Honduras	El Salvador	1979	1980	Yes	Yes		Yes
Senegal	Guinea	1984	1989	Yes			Yes
Uganda	Kenya	1986	1987		Yes		Yes
Uganda	Tanzania	1971	1972		Yes	Yes	Yes
Uganda	Sudan	1989	1994			Yes	Yes
Mozambique	South Africa	1975	1976				No
Libya	Sudan	1969	1973	Yes			Yes
Libya	Egypt	1969	1973	Yes	Yes		Yes
Sudan	Egypt	1989	1991	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Iran	Afghanistan	1996	1997			Yes	Yes
Iraq	Saudi Arabia	1968	1969	Yes		Yes	Yes
Cambodia	Vietnam	1975	1976		Yes		Yes
Totals		14 Revolutions		8	7	6	13

55 total rivalries are initiated in the sample examined.
Revolutions in dyads that share important interests account for 24%.

Table 4: Rivalries Following Within 5 Years of SOLS Change - 1950-2005

State A	State B	Rivlary	SOLS Change	Alliance	Top 25% Annually Policy Similarity	Top 25% Annually Trade Dependence	Major Interest
United States	Cuba	1960	1957	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
United States	China	1950	1949	Yes			Yes
Honduras	Nicaragua	1980	1979	Yes		Yes	Yes
Senegal	Mauritania	1989	1984	Yes		Yes	Yes
Senegal	Guinea	1989	1984	Yes			Yes
Democratic Republic of Congo	Rwanda	1996	1994			Yes	Yes
Uganda	Kenya	1987	1986			Yes	Yes
Uganda	Tanzania	1972	1971		Yes	Yes	Yes
Uganda	Rwanda	1999	1994			Yes	Yes
Uganda	Sudan	1994	1989		Yes		Yes
Kenya	Sudan	1989	1985		Yes	Yes	Yes
Zimbabwe	South Africa	1980	1979			Yes	Yes
Libya	Sudan	1973	1969	Yes			Yes
Libya	Egypt	1973	1969	Yes		Yes	Yes
Sudan	Egypt	1991	1989	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Iran	Afghanistan	1997	1997		Yes		Yes
Iraq	Saudi Arabia	1969	1968	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cambodia	Vietnam	1976	1975			Yes	Yes
		18 SOLS Changes		9	7	13	18

55 total rivalries are initiated in the sample examined.
SOLS changes in dyads that share important interests account for 33%.

Appendix A: Robustness

Table 5: Rare Events Logistic Regression of Rivalry Initiation 1950-2005

	(Revolution Only) $\hat{\beta}$/se	(Shared Foreign Policy) $\hat{\beta}$/se	(Alliance) $\hat{\beta}$/se	(Trade Dependence) $\hat{\beta}$/se
Revolution	2.057***	-3.710	1.178+	1.947***
	(0.479)	(2.937)	(0.602)	(0.477)
× Foreign Policy		6.553*		
		(3.222)		
× Alliance			2.784*	
			(1.346)	
×$Trade$				12.361
				(11.822)
Shared Foreign Policy	1.976	-0.262	2.012	2.075
	(1.515)	(1.529)	(1.499)	(1.507)
Alliance	-0.494	-0.518	-2.101+	-0.493
	(0.507)	(0.509)	(1.210)	(0.504)
Trade Dependence	10.525*	11.717*	14.430**	10.846
	(4.709)	(4.675)	(4.898)	(8.415)
Contiguity	2.482*	2.615*	2.557*	2.504*
	(1.259)	(1.297)	(1.210)	(1.249)
Capability Disparity	-3.442+	-3.372+	-3.323	-3.395+
	(1.968)	(2.001)	(2.049)	(1.978)
Democracy	-2.724*	-2.733*	-2.688+	-2.518+
	(1.359)	(1.365)	(1.394)	(1.419)
Cold War	-0.466	-0.601	-0.651	-0.459
	(0.898)	(0.984)	(0.890)	(0.908)
Systemic Shock	0.206	0.154	0.111	0.193
	(0.958)	(1.016)	(0.962)	(0.963)
Major Power in Dyad	0.667	0.598	0.643	0.708
	(0.825)	(0.832)	(0.820)	(0.818)
Ongoing Territorial Dispute	2.874**	3.012**	3.365***	2.864**
	(0.911)	(0.929)	(0.972)	(0.917)
Constant	-7.383*	-5.533+	-7.109*	-7.514*
	(3.200)	(3.023)	(3.053)	(3.224)
Observations	36854	36854	36854	36854

Robust standard errors clustered on the dyad –in parentheses
Cubic polynomial of years of peace included in model but not reported
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 in 2-tail test

Table 6: Bivariate Relationship - SOLS Change and Rivalry Onset (1950-2005)

	No Revolution-Last 5 Years	Revolution-Last 5 Years	Total
No Rivalry Onset	**43,503** **(43,494.8)**	**9,422** **(9,430.2)**	52,925
Rivalry Onset	**37** **(45.2)**	**18** **(9.8)**	55
Total	43,540	9,440	52,980
Pearson chi2(1) = 8.3577 Pr = 0.004			
Note: Cells display the observed frequency over the expected frequency (in parentheses.)			

Table 7: Robustness to change in observation window - Foreign Policy

	(1) 2-Year b/se	(2) 3-Year b/se	(3) 4-Year b/se	(4) 5-Year b/se	(5) 6-Year b/se	(6) 7-Year b/se	(7) 8-Year b/se
Revolution × Shared Foreign Policy	8.132+	12.566**	3.946	7.844*	8.016**	7.676*	7.212*
	(4.163)	(4.653)	(2.880)	(3.223)	(3.019)	(3.108)	(3.243)
Shared Foreign Policy	1.540	1.629	1.519	0.061	-0.299	-0.070	0.026
	(1.985)	(1.737)	(1.762)	(1.530)	(1.539)	(1.649)	(1.337)
Revolution	-5.542	-10.135*	-1.912	-4.935+	-5.079+	-5.002+	-4.851
	(3.816)	(4.361)	(2.584)	(2.938)	(2.749)	(2.851)	(3.039)
Alliance	-0.728	-0.718	-0.788	-0.527	-0.475	-0.433	-0.869
	(0.464)	(0.479)	(0.523)	(0.509)	(0.534)	(0.560)	(0.597)
Trade Dependence	0.711	-2.163	-1.224	1.807	6.071	7.701*	4.428
	(6.869)	(7.426)	(5.785)	(4.678)	(3.950)	(3.913)	(4.495)
Contiguity	2.648*	2.459*	2.242+	2.568*	2.642*	2.690*	2.659*
	(1.189)	(1.150)	(1.239)	(1.298)	(1.341)	(1.327)	(1.245)
Capability Disparity	-3.062*	-2.966+	-3.106+	-3.596+	-2.172	-1.878	-3.185
	(1.499)	(1.565)	(1.751)	(2.002)	(1.981)	(2.135)	(2.160)
Democracy	-5.831***	-3.843**	-2.588*	-3.154*	-3.907*	-5.335**	-3.292+
	(1.647)	(1.455)	(1.132)	(1.366)	(1.594)	(1.804)	(1.727)
Cold War	-0.790	0.097	0.388	-0.393	-0.433	-0.438	-0.343
	(1.038)	(1.058)	(1.371)	(0.985)	(1.009)	(0.990)	(0.928)
Systemic Shock	0.173	0.902	1.320	0.339	0.344	0.346	0.500
	(1.010)	(1.036)	(1.373)	(1.016)	(1.061)	(1.048)	(0.993)
Major Power in Dyad	0.001	0.206	0.307	0.412	0.210	0.299	0.583
	(0.760)	(0.772)	(0.807)	(0.832)	(0.853)	(0.892)	(0.880)
Ongoing Territorial Dispute	2.705**	2.419**	2.512**	2.887**	3.121**	3.238**	2.984**
	(0.985)	(0.912)	(0.935)	(0.930)	(0.964)	(1.020)	(1.032)
Constant	-5.832+	-6.990*	-7.704*	-5.910+	-6.756*	-7.070*	-6.184*
	(3.193)	(3.030)	(3.288)	(3.024)	(2.991)	(3.151)	(3.011)
Observations	38118	38049	37959	36854	35783	34689	33602

Robust standard errors clustered on the dyad

Cubic polynomial of years of peace included in model but not reported

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 in 2-tail test

Table 8: Robustness to change in observation window - Alliance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	2-Year	3-Year	4-Year	5-Year	6-Year	7-Year	8-Year
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Alliance × Revolution	0.865	0.830	1.670	3.391*	3.479*	3.902**	3.229*
	(0.985)	(1.014)	(1.076)	(1.346)	(1.404)	(1.403)	(1.462)
Alliance	-0.984	-0.967	-1.477+	-2.623*	-2.686*	-2.841*	-2.827*
	(0.599)	(0.622)	(0.788)	(1.210)	(1.289)	(1.283)	(1.306)
Revolution	1.555**	1.167*	1.088+	1.096+	1.026+	0.585	0.704
	(0.582)	(0.591)	(0.602)	(0.603)	(0.608)	(0.682)	(0.624)
Shared Foreign Policy	2.689	3.053	2.482	2.371	2.231	2.343	2.250+
	(2.022)	(1.914)	(1.583)	(1.499)	(1.508)	(1.553)	(1.310)
Trade Dependence	1.434	-1.516	-0.296	4.443	8.856*	11.350**	6.751
	(6.817)	(7.356)	(5.935)	(4.900)	(4.330)	(3.869)	(4.741)
Contiguity	2.609*	2.392*	2.242+	2.484*	2.555*	2.631*	2.600*
	(1.161)	(1.136)	(1.200)	(1.211)	(1.251)	(1.216)	(1.176)
Capability Disparity	-3.019*	-2.976+	-3.068+	-3.582+	-2.104	-1.686	-3.147
	(1.499)	(1.555)	(1.771)	(2.050)	(2.035)	(2.177)	(2.220)
Democracy	-5.727***	-3.766**	-2.550*	-3.021*	-3.964*	-5.803**	-3.544+
	(1.595)	(1.407)	(1.149)	(1.394)	(1.686)	(1.928)	(1.862)
Cold War	-0.772	0.134	0.340	-0.422	-0.453	-0.481	-0.337
	(1.031)	(1.056)	(1.308)	(0.890)	(0.905)	(0.877)	(0.824)
Systemic Shock	0.160	0.897	1.285	0.330	0.332	0.314	0.491
	(1.006)	(1.042)	(1.321)	(0.963)	(1.009)	(0.995)	(0.941)
Major Power in Dyad	0.059	0.256	0.329	0.452	0.228	0.263	0.599
	(0.771)	(0.779)	(0.814)	(0.820)	(0.832)	(0.858)	(0.901)
Ongoing Territorial Dispute	2.700**	2.423*	2.676**	3.285***	3.559***	3.876***	3.539**
	(1.016)	(0.962)	(0.996)	(0.973)	(0.987)	(1.058)	(1.170)
Constant	-6.834*	-8.185*	-8.399**	-7.511*	-8.482**	-8.728**	-7.755**
	(3.291)	(3.271)	(3.176)	(3.054)	(3.031)	(3.125)	(2.946)
Observations	38118	38049	37959	36854	35783	34689	33602

Robust standard errors clustered on the dyad
Cubic polynomial of years of peace included in model but not reported
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 in 2-tail test

Table 9: Robustness to change in observation window - Trade

	(1) 2-Year b/se	(2) 3-Year b/se	(3) 4-Year b/se	(4) 5-Year b/se	(5) 6-Year b/se	(6) 7-Year b/se	(7) 8-Year b/se
Revolution × Trade Dependence	23.192	29.780+	27.261*	19.755+	25.855**	17.059+	19.876+
	(14.211)	(17.646)	(13.376)	(11.827)	(9.680)	(8.811)	(11.139)
Trade Dependence	-4.766	-11.360	-8.982	-4.172	-0.226	4.952	-0.424
	(13.235)	(16.853)	(12.095)	(8.418)	(7.332)	(5.130)	(8.685)
Revolution	1.651***	1.214*	1.402**	1.913***	1.807***	1.673**	1.339*
	(0.488)	(0.504)	(0.488)	(0.477)	(0.499)	(0.524)	(0.535)
Shared Foreign Policy	2.651	3.014	2.530	2.403	2.304	2.413	2.356+
	(2.001)	(1.895)	(1.589)	(1.507)	(1.508)	(1.539)	(1.262)
Alliance	-0.702	-0.679	-0.773	-0.496	-0.446	-0.430	-0.877
	(0.465)	(0.478)	(0.524)	(0.505)	(0.527)	(0.555)	(0.598)
Contiguity	2.617*	2.416*	2.258+	2.447+	2.509+	2.542*	2.528*
	(1.171)	(1.132)	(1.204)	(1.249)	(1.286)	(1.293)	(1.227)
Capability Disparity	-3.027*	-2.999+	-3.079+	-3.600+	-2.094	-1.872	-3.127
	(1.500)	(1.554)	(1.758)	(1.979)	(1.967)	(2.113)	(2.120)
Democracy	-5.800***	-3.679*	-2.423*	-2.988*	-3.592*	-5.106**	-3.001+
	(1.738)	(1.537)	(1.207)	(1.419)	(1.576)	(1.764)	(1.781)
Cold War	-0.752	0.187	0.457	-0.245	-0.268	-0.276	-0.186
	(1.061)	(1.104)	(1.390)	(0.908)	(0.933)	(0.922)	(0.868)
Systemic Shock	0.158	0.919	1.326	0.388	0.428	0.433	0.574
	(1.036)	(1.083)	(1.399)	(0.963)	(1.011)	(1.014)	(0.952)
Major Power in Dyad	0.077	0.299	0.393	0.510	0.328	0.380	0.634
	(0.788)	(0.782)	(0.803)	(0.818)	(0.823)	(0.856)	(0.848)
Ongoing Territorial Dispute	2.674**	2.367*	2.475**	2.744**	2.949**	3.070**	2.827**
	(0.994)	(0.932)	(0.940)	(0.918)	(0.933)	(0.992)	(1.012)
Constant	-6.832*	-8.238*	-8.655**	-7.908*	-9.022**	-9.161**	-8.167**
	(3.343)	(3.344)	(3.335)	(3.225)	(3.187)	(3.280)	(3.087)
Observations	38118	38049	37959	36854	35783	34689	33602

Robust standard errors clustered on the dyad

Cubic polynomial of years of peace included in model but not reported

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 in 2-tail test

Table 10: Logistic Regression 1950-2005 (CHISOLS Change Variable)

	(Revolution Only) $\hat{\beta}$/se	(Shared Foreign Policy) $\hat{\beta}$/se	(Alliance) $\hat{\beta}$/se	(Trade Dependence) $\hat{\beta}$/se
SOLS Change	1.629***	-3.922+	0.938+	1.496**
	(0.468)	(2.265)	(0.522)	(0.465)
× Shared Foreign Policy		6.303*		
		(2.517)		
× Alliance			15.886***	
			(3.727)	
× Trade Dependence				16.637
				(11.351)
Shared Foreign Policy	1.878	-0.284	2.300	1.922
	(1.415)	(1.509)	(1.433)	(1.422)
Alliance	-0.524	-0.541	-15.737***	-0.518
	(0.535)	(0.547)	(3.603)	(0.531)
Trade Dependence	2.369	3.612	9.958	-2.175
	(4.197)	(4.116)	(6.527)	(7.476)
Contiguity	2.665*	2.735*	2.791*	2.674*
	(1.191)	(1.197)	(1.127)	(1.190)
Capability Disparity	-3.738+	-3.557+	-3.458+	-3.720+
	(2.003)	(2.010)	(2.035)	(2.016)
Democracy	-3.213*	-3.256*	-3.254*	-3.035*
	(1.368)	(1.415)	(1.411)	(1.401)
Cold War	-0.089	-0.153	-0.035	-0.097
	(0.821)	(0.869)	(0.820)	(0.834)
Systemic Shock	0.449	0.389	0.468	0.456
	(0.852)	(0.888)	(0.841)	(0.855)
Major Power in Dyad	0.889	0.874	0.990	0.920
	(0.848)	(0.868)	(0.858)	(0.849)
Ongoing Territorial Dispute	2.213*	2.221*	2.075*	2.184*
	(0.929)	(0.951)	(0.943)	(0.928)
Constant	-7.776*	-6.077+	-8.178*	-7.816*
	(3.293)	(3.139)	(3.274)	(3.315)
Observations	36854	36854	36854	36854

Robust standard errors clustered on the dyad

Cubic polynomial of years of peace included in model but not reported

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 in 2-tail test

Table 11: Logistic Regression 1950-2005 (Threshold Robustness - Alliances)

	(1) Threshold =1 b/se	(2) Threshold = 2 b/se	(3) Threshold = 3 b/se	(4) Threshold = 4 b/se	(5) Threshold = 5 b/se	(6) Threshold = 6 b/se
Threshold = 1 × Alliance	15.886*** (3.590)					
Threshold = 1	0.985+ (0.541)					
Threshold = 2 × Alliance		16.387*** (3.357)				
Threshold = 2		1.263* (0.550)				
Threshold = 3 × Alliance			3.391* (1.346)			
Threshold = 3			1.096+ (0.603)			
Threshold = 4 × Alliance				3.994** (1.405)		
Threshold = 4				0.805 (0.665)		
Threshold = 5 × Alliance					17.356*** (0.940)	
Threshold = 5					-13.292*** (0.556)	
Threshold = 6 × Alliancer						17.863*** (1.512)
Threshold = 6						-13.556*** (1.040)
Alliance	-15.675*** (3.536)	-15.937*** (3.293)	-2.623* (1.210)	-2.758* (1.230)	-1.660* (0.781)	-0.863 (0.575)
Trade Dependence	9.360 (6.652)	8.156 (7.128)	4.443 (4.900)	2.480 (6.528)	-1.720 (8.213)	-1.475 (5.850)
Shared Foreign Policy	2.441 (1.494)	2.376 (1.497)	2.371 (1.499)	2.535 (1.582)	2.402 (1.524)	2.269 (1.446)
Contiguity	2.697* (1.135)	2.579* (1.202)	2.484* (1.211)	2.463* (1.178)	2.383* (1.122)	2.590* (1.121)
Capability Disparity	-3.551+ (1.961)	-3.548+ (1.947)	-3.582+ (2.050)	-3.422+ (2.025)	-4.039* (2.045)	-4.015* (1.957)
Democracy	-3.215* (1.408)	-2.863* (1.382)	-3.021* (1.394)	-2.758* (1.400)	-3.019* (1.277)	-3.258** (1.240)
Cold War	-0.196 (0.825)	-0.416 (0.857)	-0.422 (0.890)	-0.400 (0.865)	-0.235 (0.842)	-0.122 (0.833)
Systemic Shock	0.490 (0.849)	0.470 (0.935)	0.330 (0.963)	0.251 (0.920)	0.305 (0.859)	0.578 (0.838)
Major Power in Dyad	0.952 (0.849)	0.780 (0.828)	0.452 (0.820)	0.265 (0.877)	0.262 (0.901)	0.606 (0.831)
Ongoing Territorial Dispute	2.666** (0.867)	2.913*** (0.868)	3.285*** (0.973)	3.286** (1.013)	2.689** (0.943)	2.360* (0.937)
Constant	-7.908* (3.219)	-7.737* (3.093)	-7.511* (3.054)	-7.604* (3.058)	-6.833* (3.025)	-7.152* (3.115)
Observations	36854	36854	36854	36854		

Robust standard errors clustered on the dyad

Cubic polynomial of years of peace included in model but not reported

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 in 2-tail test

Table 12: Logistic Regression 1950-2005 (Threshold Robustness - Shared Foreign Policy)

	(1) Threshold = 1 b/se	(2) Threshold = 2 b/se	(3) Threshold = 3 b/se	(4) Threshold = 4 b/se	(5) Threshold = 5 b/se	(6) Threshold = 6 b/se
Threshold = 1 × Shared Foreign Policy	6.209* (2.616)					
Threshold = 1	-3.610 (2.313)					
Threshold = 2 × Shared Foreign Policy		7.043* (2.742)				
Threshold = 2		-3.976 (2.441)				
Threshold = 3 × Shared Foreign Policy			7.394* (3.264)			
Threshold = 3			-4.524 (2.998)			
Threshold = 4 × Shared Foreign Policy				8.136* (3.651)		
Threshold = 4				-5.191 (3.348)		
Threshold = 5 × Shared Foreign Policy					2.403 (2.232)	
Threshold = 5					-0.453 (2.023)	
Threshold = 6 × Shared Foreign Policy						-1.923 (2.008)
Threshold = 6						3.383+ (1.833)
Shared Foreign Policy	-0.347 (1.650)	-0.674 (1.651)	0.004 (1.528)	0.028 (1.501)	1.600 (1.808)	2.159 (1.580)
Alliance	-0.607 (0.527)	-0.489 (0.526)	-0.522 (0.512)	-0.375 (0.525)	-0.354 (0.569)	-0.396 (0.560)
Trade Dependence	3.355 (3.004)	3.052 (2.996)	1.622 (3.399)	0.733 (3.579)	-1.127 (4.651)	-1.515 (4.365)
Contiguity	2.823* (1.125)	2.752* (1.173)	2.697* (1.206)	2.691* (1.222)	2.621* (1.160)	2.583* (1.087)
Capability Disparity	-4.070* (1.990)	-4.220* (1.951)	-3.954* (1.996)	-3.760+ (1.980)	-4.061* (1.901)	-4.261* (1.907)
Democracy	-3.287* (1.579)	-3.265* (1.576)	-3.124* (1.493)	-2.915* (1.462)	-3.048* (1.360)	-3.170* (1.368)
Cold War	-0.784 (0.927)	-0.859 (0.985)	-0.726 (0.996)	-0.709 (0.998)	-0.517 (0.960)	-0.508 (0.900)
Systemic Shock	0.311 (0.915)	0.339 (0.975)	0.255 (0.985)	0.270 (0.985)	0.359 (0.927)	0.323 (0.847)
Major Power in Dyad	0.855 (0.890)	0.780 (0.878)	0.489 (0.859)	0.422 (0.833)	0.441 (0.788)	0.548 (0.844)
Ongoing Territorial Dispute	2.500** (0.895)	2.646** (0.887)	2.654** (0.929)	2.579** (0.938)	2.156* (0.944)	2.031* (0.932)
Constant	-6.053* (3.025)	-5.734+ (2.937)	-5.970* (2.921)	-6.120* (2.940)	-6.963* (3.221)	-6.891* (3.038)
Observations	35984	35984	35984	35984	35984	35984

Robust standard errors clustered on the dyad
Cubic polynomial of years of peace included in model but not reported
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 in 2-tail test

Table 13: Logistic Regression 1950-2005 (Threshold Robustness - Trade Dependence)

	(1) Threshold = 1 b/se	(2) Threshold = 2 b/se	(3) Threshold = 3 b/se	(4) Threshold = 4 b/se	(5) Threshold = 5 b/se	(6) Threshold = 6 b/se
Threshold = 1 × Trade Dependence	18.808					
	(12.021)					
Threshold = 1	1.598***					
	(0.454)					
Threshold = 2 × Trade Dependence		17.111				
		(11.827)				
Threshold = 2		1.999***				
		(0.480)				
Threshold = 3 × Trade Dependence			19.755+			
			(11.827)			
Threshold = 3			1.913***			
			(0.477)			
Threshold = 4 × Trade Dependence				-3.498		
				(21.527)		
Threshold = 4				2.042***		
				(0.497)		
Threshold = 5 × Trade Dependence					19.074	
					(29.381)	
Threshold = 5					1.408*	
					(0.613)	
Threshold = 6 × Trade Dependence						-1012.741
						(874.861)
Threshold = 6						2.402*
						(0.945)
Trade Dependence	-2.339	-2.254	-4.172	0.430	-3.423	-2.102
	(7.775)	(7.467)	(8.418)	(4.899)	(7.263)	(5.727)
Shared Foreign Policy	2.273	2.286	2.403	2.364	2.484+	2.290
	(1.483)	(1.508)	(1.507)	(1.527)	(1.471)	(1.473)
Alliance	-0.606	-0.489	-0.496	-0.432	-0.402	-0.382
	(0.525)	(0.525)	(0.505)	(0.509)	(0.562)	(0.574)
Contiguity	2.583*	2.489*	2.447+	2.400+	2.408*	2.428*
	(1.170)	(1.222)	(1.249)	(1.266)	(1.186)	(1.138)
Capability Disparity	-3.712+	-3.753+	-3.600+	-3.622+	-3.829*	-4.265*
	(1.968)	(1.942)	(1.979)	(1.905)	(1.892)	(2.025)
Democracy	-3.041*	-2.913*	-2.988*	-3.022*	-3.145*	-3.221*
	(1.432)	(1.429)	(1.419)	(1.331)	(1.237)	(1.254)
Cold War	-0.188	-0.309	-0.245	-0.223	-0.076	-0.154
	(0.833)	(0.856)	(0.908)	(0.917)	(0.870)	(0.831)
Systemic Shock	0.453	0.445	0.388	0.408	0.450	0.385
	(0.874)	(0.924)	(0.963)	(0.969)	(0.907)	(0.852)
Major Power in Dyad	0.836	0.752	0.510	0.414	0.433	0.537
	(0.830)	(0.821)	(0.818)	(0.817)	(0.805)	(0.863)
Ongoing Territorial Dispute	2.500**	2.601**	2.744**	2.635**	2.327*	2.175*
	(0.881)	(0.866)	(0.918)	(0.916)	(0.927)	(0.916)
Constant	-7.867*	-7.902*	-7.908*	-7.745*	-7.390*	-6.684*
	(3.281)	(3.227)	(3.225)	(3.176)	(3.120)	(3.099)
Observations	36854	36854	36854	36854	36854	36854

multicolumn6lRobust standard errors clustered on the dyad
Cubic polynomial of years of peace included in model but not reported
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 in 2-tail test

Table 14: Logistic Regression 1950-2005 (Consensus Rivalries)

	(Revolution Only)	(Shared Foreign Policy)	(Alliance)	(Trade Dependence)
	$\hat{\beta}$/se	$\hat{\beta}$/se	$\hat{\beta}$/se	$\hat{\beta}$/se
Revolution	1.627***	-3.944	0.723	1.466**
	(0.484)	(3.007)	(0.667)	(0.495)
× Shared Foreign Policy		6.281+		
		(3.338)		
× Alliance			3.098*	
			(1.359)	
× Trade Dependence				21.960+
				(12.050)
Shared Foreign Policy	1.905	0.454	2.019	1.945
	(1.321)	(1.485)	(1.322)	(1.317)
Alliance	-0.635	-0.651	-2.361*	-0.621
	(0.577)	(0.577)	(1.187)	(0.578)
Trade Dependence	-0.162	0.407	2.752	-5.593
	(5.353)	(5.290)	(5.643)	(8.542)
Contiguity	2.654*	2.759*	2.766*	2.692*
	(1.179)	(1.200)	(1.147)	(1.169)
Capability Disparity	-3.520+	-3.487+	-3.422	-3.481+
	(2.055)	(2.102)	(2.108)	(2.066)
Democracy	-2.402+	-2.398*	-2.343+	-2.235+
	(1.235)	(1.224)	(1.215)	(1.295)
Cold War	-0.115	-0.226	-0.204	-0.116
	(0.847)	(0.924)	(0.861)	(0.857)
Systemic Shock	0.127	0.083	0.106	0.117
	(0.904)	(0.952)	(0.913)	(0.908)
Major Power in Dyad	0.524	0.508	0.580	0.567
	(0.830)	(0.853)	(0.856)	(0.826)
Ongoing Territorial Dispute	1.847+	1.933+	2.250*	1.854+
	(1.033)	(1.051)	(1.134)	(1.036)
Constant	-7.509*	-6.299*	-7.466*	-7.598*
	(3.149)	(3.169)	(3.103)	(3.181)
Observations	36854	36854	36854	36854

multicolumn4lRobust standard errors clustered on the dyad
Cubic polynomial of years of peace included in model but not reported
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 in 2-tail test

The figures presented below include the full observed range of values of trade dependence. As noted above, 99% of all trade dependence values fall below 0.107. Given that 1% of all observed values span the range from 0.107 to 1, it would be unreasonable to attempt to draw inferences base upon these higher levels of trade dependence.

Figure 7: Effect of Revolution conditional on Trade - Full Scale

Figure 8: Effect of Trade conditional on Revolution - Full Scale